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O objectivo deste trabalho de investigação consiste em analisar se o crédito comercial obtido junto dos 
fornecedores e o endividamento bancário são considerados duas fontes de financiamento substitutas 
e/ou complementares. Usando uma amostra em dados painel de 468 e 7019 pequenas e médias 
empresas (PME) Portuguesas e Espanholas respectivamente, e recorrendo ao método de estimação 
GMM, para controlar potenciais problemas de endogeneidade, os resultados confirmam a hipótese de 
substituição, isto é, as empresas recorrem ao crédito junto dos fornecedores quando vêm restringido o 
seu acesso ao financiamento junto dos bancos. Este racionamento no acesso ao crédito bancário é 
particularmente relevante para as empresas que mantêm uma relação de monopólio (negoceiam com 
apenas um banco), o que indicia maiores problemas de selecção adversa e risco moral para estas 
empresas. Todavia, apesar de a hipótese de substituição ser confirmada, a evidência empírica aponta 
para o facto de que as hipóteses de substituição e complementaridade não serem mutuamente 
exclusivas, em particular para um grupo específico de empresas: as empresas mais jovens e mais 
pequenas. Em consonância com as teorias que enfatizam o conteúdo informativo veiculado pelo 
crédito comercial (qualidade da gestão, nível de risco do cliente), os resultados obtidos confirmam que 
o recurso ao crédito concedido pelos fornecedores ajuda as empresas mais jovens e mais pequenas a 
consolidarem a sua reputação no mercado de crédito. O montante de crédito comercial obtido pode ser 
visto como um sinal que veicula a informação privada detida pelo fornecedor aos bancos a baixo 





This paper examines if trade credit could be considered as a substitute and/or a complement to bank 
credit in order to assess the existence of credit rationing. Using a panel dataset of 468 and 7019 
Portuguese and Spanish small medium size enterprises, in the period 1998-2006, and controlling for 
endogeneity problems by using GMM estimators, the results confirm the existence of credit rationing, 
since the substitution hypothesis is confirmed. This effect is particularly strong for firms that 
maintaining an exclusive relationship with one bank, which indicate a greater severity of adverse 
selection problems for those firms. Although the substitution hypothesis is confirmed, the results seem 
indicate that the substitution and complementary hypothesis are not mutually exclusive, especially for 
a specific group of firms: the younger and smaller firms. In line with the theories that emphasize the 
informational role of trade credit, due the informative advantage of suppliers, our empirical results 
confirm that trade credit allow the younger and smaller firms to improve their reputation, as trade 
credit reveals the private information of the supplier to the bank, in turn, banks can update their beliefs 
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The trade credit represents 17.8% of total assets for all American firms in 1991 and 
in European countries trade credit represents more than a quarter of total corporate 
assets (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). These numbers are recently confirmed by Mateut 
and Mizen (2002). Attending to these numbers a relevant question arises: Why do 
companies rely on their suppliers to obtain financing, rather than specialized 
financial intermediaries such as banks? 
 
In fact, in the presence of specialized financial intermediaries, it is far from obvious 
why the exchange of goods is bundled with a credit transaction: When trade credit is 
cheaper than bank credit, as is often the case, the puzzle is that suppliers are willing 
to lend. When trade credit is more expensive, the puzzle is that banks are unwilling 
to lend. Indeed, a sizeable fraction of firms repeatedly fail to take advantage of early 
payments discounts and thus end up borrowing from their suppliers at annual interest 
rates above 40 percent (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1997)1. Why do not banks increase 
these firms’ credits instead? 
 
A common explanation for trade credit is that suppliers have a monitoring advantage 
over banks. In the course of business, suppliers obtain information about the 
borrower which other lenders can only obtain at a cost as argued by Schwartz and 
Whitcomb, (1978, 1979), Emery, (1987), Freixas, (1993), Biais and Gollier (1997) 
and Jain, (2001) among others. This is particularly true when the costumers are 
small, young and opaque firms (Beger and Udell, 1995; Wilner, 2000) or operate in 
countries with poorly developed financial institutions (Fishman and Love, 2003). 
Thus equilibrium credit rationing related to ex-ante asymmetric information could 
result in more use of trade credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)2. Based on these 
arguments bank and trade credit are two (somehow imperfect) substitutable financial 
resources, which is referred in the literature as the substitution hypothesis (Meltzer, 
1960).  
                                               
1 See Wilner, (2000) and Ng, et al., (1999) to know how implicit rates can be calculated from trade 
credit terms. 
2  Schwartz (1974) is traditionally considered as the first paper pointing out this aspect. 
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However, recent theoretical paper such as Biais and Gollier, (1997) and Burkart and 
Ellingsen, (2004) suggest that bank credit and trade credit could be also be 
considered two complementary sources of financing. 
 
According to the model of Biais and Gollier (1997) the use of trade credit can 
alleviate the credit constrains for firms that suffer from imperfect information and 
credit rationing directly, in accordance with the substitution hypothesis and 
indirectly. Indirectly because trade credit acts as a signal that reveals supplier’s 
unique information to the bank, than banks which agree to lend when suppliers also 
lend to their customers. 
 
In their model, credit rationing occurs, in a first round, because the bank can not 
always assess the quality of a firm with enough precision. As a consequence, some 
firms with positive net present value projects could not be financed with bank debt. 
Nevertheless, suppliers could sometimes find it profitable to finance some of these 
firms and then extend trade credit. In a second round, banks observe this actual use 
of trade credit and update their beliefs concerning the quality of the firm. When the 
equilibrium is reached, some firms which would have suffered from credit rationing 
in the absence of trade credit finance actually finance net present value projects with 
a mix of trade credit and bank credit. Based on the result of this equilibrium game 
model, trade credit and bank credit are two complementary resources which are 
referred to as the complementary hypothesis3. The agency mode of Bukart and 
Ellingsen (2004) reaches a similar result. In their model, additional trade credit 
increases the investment size and thereby the entrepreneur’s residual return and 
hence decreases the entrepreneur’s incentive to divert cash. As a consequence bank 
debt limit increases, making bank debt and trade credit complements.  
 
The main objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence if trade credit could 
be considered as a substitute and/or as a complement to bank debt in order to assess 
the existence of credit rationing. More specifically, we analyse if trade credit could 
contribute to build a “good reputation” in the borrower market, in other words, the 
                                               
3 See Bond  (2005), Berlin (2003) and Burkart, et al., (2004) for recent assessments on the nature of 
trade credit vis-à-vis bank debt. 
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availability of trade credit facilitates the access to bank credit, especially for young 
small firms, due to their financial opacity.  
 
A panel dataset of small medium size (SME) of Portuguese and Spanish firms in the 
period 1998-2006 is used to test the complementary role of trade credit versus the 
substitution hypothesis. The option to study Portuguese and Spanish firms is 
sustained in the evidence provided by Breig (1994). According to Breig (1994) trade 
credit tends to be more used in countries bank based oriented comparing to 
economies where financial markets play an information transmission and monitoring 
role such as the United States. In fact, the previous research has been conducted in 
the United States, a country strongly immersed in the common-law system4. We 
define the common-law model, which is built on Anglo-Saxon principles, as one 
with the pronounced leaning towards market, as opposed to bank debt financing. 
Legally, a common-law model is characterized by its relative strong protection to 
minority investors. Conversely, the European continental civil-law model is 
characterized by bias towards bank debt financing and relative minority-investor 
protection5. In this research, we broaden the previous research by looking at Portugal 
and Spain, civil-law countries, which have a financial system dominated by the 
presence of financial intermediaries, mostly banks.  
 
The focus on small firms can be explained for various reasons. First, small firms are 
more likely to suffer information problems in capital markets. They are typically 
restricted to obtaining external finance only from financial institutions and suppliers. 
Public markets are only accessible for large firms. Second, due to the lack of credit 
history, the impossibility to credibly disclose their quality and the lack of separation 
between ownership and management the asymmetric information increases between 
insiders and outsiders (lenders). Third, SME play an important role in the world 
economies (Berger and Frame, 2006). In Portugal, SME are responsible for 75 
percent and 83 percent of employment in industry and services respectively. A 
                                               
4 Only a few papers address the complementary role of trade credit versus the substitution hypothesis. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) addresses this important role of trade credit for the United States. An 
exception was Cook (1997), who studies this topic for Russia data.   
5 Fishman and Love (2003) and Demirgüç-kunt and Maksiovic (2001) pointed out that trade credit is 
more prevalent in countries with less efficient legal systems.   
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similar situation is found in Spain (the percentage of employment created in industry 
and services is 72 percent and 79 percent, respectively) (IAPMEI, 2007). 
 
The study is structured in the following way. In the next section, a brief review of the 
literature is compiled. In the third section, data is presented and the methodology 
used for contrasting our hypothesis is described. In the forth section, the relation 
between trade credit and bank debt and the effect of the strength of banking 
relationship on the availability of bank credit are studied. In the final section, the 
main conclusions are stated. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There are a number of empirical findings suggesting that firms suffering from credit 
rationing use trade credit. Nilsen (2002) finds that during monetary contractions, 
small firms are likely to be particularly bank credit rationed, react by borrowing 
more from their suppliers. Similar empirical evidence is provided by Biais et al., 
(1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995). According to these authors small firms 
which are more likely to be credit rationed, tend to rely more on trade credit6.  
 
These empirical findings raise a question: Why is trade credit available when bank 
credit is rationed? Suppliers are themselves more likely to be credit constrained and 
to have high cost of funds than banks. Hence when banks cannot lend, suppliers 
should not be able to lend either.  
 
There are a broader set of trade credit theories. A notable contribution is the work of 
Nadiri (1969). Nadiri was the first author to formally consider trade credit extension 
as part of an optimal selling policy. With the advent of contract theory authors have 
identified more precisely how the extension of trade credit differs from a decrease in 
price or an increase in advertising, and why trade credit is not crowed. Another early 
theoretical contribution is Ferris (1981), who argues that trade credit, allows the 
suppliers and the customers to pool liquidity risks. However, Ferris (1981) does not 
explain why the risk pooling not handled by financial intermediaries. Other 
                                               
6 Trade credit tends to be more important for unlisted firms (Giannetti, 2003), except possibly in the 
United States (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
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explanations of used of trade credit are based on buyers´ private information about 
their own willingness or ability to pay and the seller’s resulting incentive to price 
discriminate (Smith, 1987; Brennan et al., 1988); on suppliers private information 
about product quality (Smith, 1987; Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long et al., 1993); trade 
credit serves as a warranty for product quality (Long et al.,1993); on suppliers´ 
advantage in liquidating collateral (Frank and Maksimovic, 2005); on taxes effect 
(Brick and Fung, 1984) and on long-term buyer/seller relationships (Wilner, 2000). 
For a historical account of trade credit see Cameron (1967).  
 
More recently, assuming the assumption that suppliers have private information 
about their customers, in the course of business, suppliers obtain information about 
borrower which other lenders can only obtain at a cost. Biais and Gollier (1997) 
demonstrate theoretically that trade credit can facilitate aggregation of the supllier´s 
information with the bank’s information and thus alleviate an information asymmetry 
which otherwise would preclude financing of positive net present value (NPV) 
projects. Consider a market for an input good. There are different types of buyers. 
Some are “good”, the projects for which they need the input have positive NPV. 
Other buyers (the “bad”) have negative NPV projects. The buyers privately know 
their own type, while the bank and the supplier only have different signals about it. 
When bank credit is the only source of financing, if the proportion of negative NPV 
buyers is large and if the information of the banks is not precise, all buyers, including 
the “good”, are denied credit. These prevent them from buying the input and 
investing in positive NPV projects. For these authors this credit market breakdown is 
due to asymmetric information as credit rationing7.  
 
In contrast, when trade credit can be used and if sellers have sufficient expected 
future cash-flows to pledge collateral8, there exists a separating equilibrium where 
sellers extend trade credit to their customers only if they have received a good signal, 
and where the positive information contained in the availability of trade credit 
                                               
7 This definition is in spirit of the definition of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that relates the market 
breakdown to asymmetric information. 
8 According to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), firms simultaneously give and take credit because 
receivables can be collateralized. Once an invoice is pledge as collateral, it becomes completely 
illiquid from the firms perspective, and the firm can obtain additional bank credit against the 
receivables. Thus, offering an additional dollar of trade credit does not force a firm to reduce its real 
investment by one dollar. 
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induces the bank to also lend (if they also have received a good signal). In this 
context, trade credit plays an important role because it is a credible way for the seller 
to convey its private information to the bank. If the seller is willing to extend trade 
credit, and thus to bear the default risk of the buyer, it must be that it has good 
information about the latter. On observing this, the bank updates positively its beliefs 
about the buyer, and therefore agrees to lend. In other words, trade credit enables the 
private information of the seller to be used in the lending relationship, and this 
additional information can alleviate credit rationing due to adverse selection.  
 
For Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) the monitoring advantage theory is intuitively 
appealing; however the existing models suffer from tow shortcomings. First, they fail 
to explain why a bank, being specialized in the evaluation of borrowers´ 
creditworthiness, would have less information than suppliers do. Second, if it is 
accepted that suppliers have information that banks do not have, why the theories do 
not explain why suppliers regularly lend inputs, but only very rarely lend cash.  
 
Starting with the conventional idea that moral hazard at the investment stage gives 
rise to credit rationing of poor entrepreneurs, the main innovation of the Burkart and 
Ellingsen (2004) model is that the source of the suppliers´ informational advantage is 
the input transaction itself, that is, unlike other lenders an input supplier 
automatically knows that an input transaction has been completed. Other lenders can 
only obtain this information by incurring monitoring costs. The value of input 
monitoring stems in turn from the fundamental difference between inputs and cash. 
Cash is easily diverted in particular if diversion is interpreted broadly as any use of 
resources which does not maximize the lenders´ expected return. Most inputs are less 
easily diverted, and input illiquidity facilitates trade credit9. 
 
A salient result of input transaction model is that the availability of trade credit 
increases in the amount that banks are willing to lend. For a given bank loan 
additional trade credit permits the borrower higher levels of diversion as well as 
investment. However, due to the relative illiquidity of trade credit the borrower´s 
                                               
9 The idea that illiquid assets facilitate borrowing by limiting the borrower’s discretion has earlier 
been explored by Myers and Rajan (1998). They argue that banks are able to attract depositors 
precisely because banks´ loan portfolios are relative illiquid. 
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return from investing increases by more than the return from diversion. Anticipating 
the availability trade credit boots investment rather than diversion, banks are willing 
to increase their lending10.  
 
 In summarize, according to these two recent theoretical papers (Bias and Gollier, 
1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004), there is one possible answer to the question: 
“Why trade is trade credit available when bank credit is rationed?”, trade credit 
enables the private information of the seller to be used in the lending relationship. In 
other word, lending through trade credit has an informational role. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
The data of this research were obtained from AMADEUS, a dataset collected by 
Bureau Van Dijk. This database includes standardised annual accounts (consolidated 
and unconsolidated) for approximately 9 millions of companies through Europe, 
including Eastern Europe. Due to the fact, that we have only have access to the 
Amadeus dataset since 1998, this imposition 1998 the year as a starting point for our 
analysis. To be included in the dataset, the firms must have at least one employee and 
had fulfilled the requirements established in the European Commission 
Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC)11. If not consolidated and non 
consolidated accounts are available, we choose the non consolidated ones. In order to 
control the survivor bias effect, we selected active and inactive firms operating in 
Manufacturing of Food Products and Beverages (Sub-section DA, NACE codes 15 
and 16). The option to study this sector is justified based on the fact that the 
percentage of small firms operating in Portugal and Spain is similar (about 7 
percent), when compared with the total number of Portuguese to Spanish SME. This 
is a guarantee of the representation of our samples in the two countries. Because our 
main focus of analysis is small young firms, firms with more than 25 years were 
dropped. After eliminating firms with too many missing and inconsistent data (e.g. 
                                               
10 The main distinction between the agency model of Biais and Gollier (1997) and the input 
transaction model of Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) is: whereas the first model focuses on the borrower 
screening, the second model is concerned with borrower moral hazard. In fact, in screening models 
there is no distinction between cash and lending inputs. 
11 According to the European Commission Recommendation (2003/61/CE) to be considered a small 
firm, for at least two criteria need to be respected: i) having less than 250 employees and ii) having an 
annual business volume not exceeding € 50 million or assets not exceeding € 43 million. 
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total assets are different from total shareholders funds plus liabilities), our final 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 468 and 7019 Portuguese and Spanish 
SME, respectively for the period of 1998 - 2006. 
 
To contrast if the trade credit is a substitute and/or a complement of bank debt in 









   (1) 
 
where X stands for the j factors considered for each firm i, ηi is the firm fixed effects, 
λt is year fixed-effects and νit is the error term. 
 
The dependent variable, following Blasio (2005) is the ratio of the difference 
between debtors and creditors to total assets - trade credit (TC). To examine how the 
company i resorts the credit from suppliers when facing different values of banking 
financing in studied periods, we use the variable bank credit (BC) which has been 
proxied with the ratio of bank debt to total assets as an independent variable. We also 
include the variables age and size as in dependent variables. According to Berger and 
Udell (1995, 1998) the age of the firm reflects the reputation that is openly 
transmitted to the market; it plays a different role from the information that bank 
acquires through the level of trade credit used by the firm. The variable age is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the time elapsed between firms founding date and 
the year of measurement. Another source of public information about the firm comes 
from its balance sheet. The financial statements can provide information by which 
we can assess the risk of the company, such as its size, capacity for generating 
internal funds and financial leverage. Berger and Udell (1998, 2002) consider that 
the size of the borrower to be an inverse measure of its information opaqueness, as 
smaller companies use likely to be in poorer financial condition and have less 
experience and less public information available to the public. We use the natural 
logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of the firm.12 In attempt to explain 
variations in the use of trade credit by firms, we also include as independent 
                                               
12  Firm size may be related to many other concerns than financial opacity, Beck et al. (2003) provide 
several interpretations of the determinants of firm size. 
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variables asset structure, accounts turnover, inventory turnover, sales growth, 
liquidity and profitability (see Appendix I for a detailed definition of variables)13.  
 
We first analyse the relationship between trade credit and bank debt in order to 
assess the existence of credit rationing. The evaluation of this link could indicate the 
presence of adverse selection that prevents firms from obtaining the bank financing 
they need. Next, we complete our study analysing if information conveyed by trade 
credit could affect the level of indebtedness of small firms. In order to do so we 
investigate the nexus between the level of debt and the interest rate. In this way we 
test how financial institutions price the debt they lend to small firms depending on 
the strength of their relationship. To do this, we split the sample into companies 
which obtain funds from just one bank than those doing so from several banks, by 
introducing a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm obtains funds from 
just one financial institution, and zero otherwise. 
 
In order to test this point, the dependent variable is bank credit. The independent 
variables include: i) interest has been proxied with the ratio of financial expenses to 
bank debt; ii) debt coverage; iii) tangibility which is also a proxy for the ability to 
pledge collateral; iv) the Altman Z-Score to capture the firms credit risk; v) age; vi) 
size and vii) trade credit (see Appendix I for a detailed definition of variables). 
 
The model (1) assumes that bank debt is exogenous or pre-determinate. However, we 
argue that trade credit is used in spite of the high interest rates implicit delayed 
payment prices (Wilner, 2000). It might seem paradoxical that firms would be using 
simultaneously two sources of financing, one being more expensive than other. But if 
they did not use trade credit than information from the seller could not be conveyed 
to the bank and the availability of credit and relative low bank rate would not be 
granted. This is especially true for small young firms due to their financial opacity 
(Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Thus bank debt is potentially 
endogenous with trade credit, which would lead to inconsistent estimations for the 
model proposed above. 
 
                                               
13 All the variables have been taken from studies into the determining factors of trade credit (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997; Blasio, 2005). 
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We address this potential problem of reverse causality by using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano, 2003), which allows us to control for 
endogeneity by using instruments. Specially, we follow the estimation strategy 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which consists of using all the right-hand 
side variables lagged twice or more as instruments.14  
 
This methodology assumes that there is no second-order serial correlation in the 
errors in first differences. For this reason, in order to test the consistency of the 
estimations, we used the test for the absence of second-order serial correlation 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Similarly, we employ the Sargan test for the 
over-identifying restrictions, which tests for the absence of correlation between 
instruments and the error term. 
 
A second estimation problem comes from the fact that it is possible that the relation 
between trade credit and bank debt is neither a correlation running from bank debt to 
trade credit nor a reverse correlation, but rather a spurious relationship attributed to 
unobservable individual heterogeneity among firms. For instance, a manager with 
good negotiation skills may be able to maintain strong relationships with suppliers 
and at the same time be able to bargain debt to a lower cost. Using panel data is a 
way to solve the endogeneity caused by spurious relationship. The parameters λt are 
temporary dummy variables that change over time, but are equal for all firms in each 
period considered. In this way, we have tried to include the economic variables 
which firms cannot control (interest rates, prices for example)15. 
 
Table I presents the mean value of different magnitudes by age of the firm’s age 
(Panel A) and its size (Panel B). 
                                               
14 It could also be argued that both, bank credit and interest rate are also endogenous variables. Using 
the GMM in the estimation of the model helps to control for this hypothetic problem. 
15 It should be emphasized that the use of trade credit is also related to macroeconomic factors 





Distribution of Sample by Age and Size 
 
 Spain Portugal 























Panel A: Distribution of Sample by age   
Infant 
[0,5] 
3.38 55.07 29.26 28.44 20.82 3.70 46.15 30.77 27.17 23,06 
Adolescent 
]5,10] 




12.88 51.70 30.96 21.64 19.42 12.95 22.73 40.90 23.09 17,88 
Old firms 
]15;25] 
19.64 48.78 26.83 17.68 22.28 19.62 26.00 26.00 25.37 18,29 












73,19 20.00 20.00 39.36 21.60 49,15 12.94 22.75 60.90 12,09 
a Bank1 is a dummy variable which takes the values one if the firm obtain funds from just one        
financial institution, and zero otherwise. 
b DBank2 is a dummy variable which takes the values one if the firm obtain funds from two financial 
institutions, and zero otherwise. 
c Bank credit is the ratio of bank debt to total assets. 
d Trade credit is the ratio of (debtors – creditors) to total assets. 
e  Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
When analysed by age Spanish SME report the same amount of bank credit and trade 
credit. For Portuguese SME, the younger firms exhibit more bank credit and also 
trade credit16. 
 
In contrast, the medium and older firms show a higher financial leverage. This could 
be due to the result of the consolidation of the company’s reputation. The dummy 
variables in both samples indicate that older and large firms work with more lenders. 
It would seem logical that the complexities deriving from size may encourage large 
firms to divide their business across several banks. In addition lenders likely want to 
maintain their connections with larger firms because they can be overseen more 
                                               
16 We classify firms according to the age in line with Berger and Udell (2002). 
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easily. The descriptive statistic and the correlations for both of samples are presented 
in appendix II, III, IV and V. 
 
4. Analysis of the results 
 
4.1 Relation between trade credit and bank credit 
 
In the presence of asymmetry information Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that 
companies establish a hierarchy of sources to be used for financing, preferring those 
carrying a lower cost, and also a lower risk. If it is assumed that suppliers offer 
discounts for prompt payment, then resorting to the delayed payment facility thereby 
offered becomes a form of financing that is more expensive than bank loans (Wilner, 
2000). It might seem paradoxical that firms would use simultaneously two sources of 
financing, one being more expensive than the other. However, our main argument, 
and in line with the models of Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Elligsen 
(2004), is if the small young firm did not use trade credit, then information from 
seller could not be conveyed to the banks, consequently banks are not willing to 
lend17. In order to contrast the relation between trade credit and bank credit, and 









10     (2) 
 
                                               
17 It should be pointed out that the existence of trade credit on firm’s balance sheet does not mean that 
it has exhausted its capacity to borrow from bank. It is well-known that suppliers grant some of their 
credit without charge and firms therefore use these funds before resorting to bank debt. Nevertheless, 
these free resources are not unlimited. 
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TABLE II  
The relationship between trade credit and bank credit 
 
 Spain Portugal 
 
Regression 
Trade Credit (1) 
Regression 
Trade Credit (2) 
Regression 
Trade Credit (3) 
Regression 
Trade Credit (4) 
Regression 
Trade Credit (1) 
Regression 
Trade Credit (2) 
Regression 
Trade Credit (3) 
Regression 




























---------- ---------- ---------- 
-0.021* 
(-1.900) 











































































































































Dage1 ---------- ---------- 
0.006*** 
(12.806) 




Dage2 ---------- ---------- 
0.005*** 
(14.233) 




Dage3 ---------- ---------- 
-0.001*** 
(-2.773) 





















Sargan Test  0.985 0.968 0.943 0.957 0.754 0.619 0.701 0.820 
Hausman Test (χ2) 142.320 133.077 117.496 163.900 38.864 36.753 15.848 50.920 
1- All regressions are estimated by using GMM, which are robust to the heterocedasticity. Sargan Test, tests of absence of over identification. T-Statistics are in parentheses. 
2- According to the Hausman Test, the trade credit model for the Spain sample is estimated by fixed – effects; for Portuguese sample the estimation is based on random effects. 
3- Trade credit which is proxied with the ratio of the difference between debtors and creditors to total assets is the dependent variable. Bank credit is the ratio of bank debt to total assets for the 
regressions (1), (3) and (4) in both of samples. In model 2 (both samples) the variable bank credit is the ratio of short term debt to total liabilities. The variable Dage1, Dage2 and Dage3 are 
dummies variables that take value one if the age of the firm is between 0 and 5 years, 5 to 10 years and 10 to 15 years, respectively. For the definition of other variables see appendix I. 
***Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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In order to contrast the correlation between the individual effects (ηi) and the 
independent variables, the Hausman test was used (Hausman, 1978). According to this 
test, if the effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables, the fixed-effects and 
random-effects estimates should not be significantly different. Following this procedure, 
the Hausman test shows that for the Spanish sample the independent variables are 
correlated with non-observable heterogeneity. For this sample we use the fixed effects 
models. We include firm and year fixed-effects. For Portuguese sample the fixed-effects 
and random-effects estimators are not statically different. The random-effects estimators 
are used.18 
 
Observing the results reported in Table II, model 1, the coefficient of the variable bank 
credit, is negative and statically significant for both samples. This result is consistent 
with the substitution hypothesis which states that firms use trade credit, in spite of its 
high cost. 
 
With effect, it has been found that the coefficient of the variable age is negative and 
statistically significant at one percent level, which means that old firms may have lower 
financial needs and may prefer internal financing (resulting from retained earnings).This 
result is strengthened by the variable size. The large firms are less opaque, it is 
reasonable to assume that suppliers offer more credit to firms of higher quality. 
Suppliers may want to protect the value of its implicit equity stake of the customer - the 
present value of the margins they makes on current and future sales, specially in 
growing firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
 
As for other control variables, they are positive and statically significant, which indicate 
in line with the results reported by Emery (1987) and Fishman and Love (2003) that 
trade credit may be related to firm’s revenues and current assets items such as accounts 
and inventory turnover, liquidity, profitability, which are themselves related to a firm’s 
field of activity or industry. For example firm’s with more liquidity, higher values for 
accounts turnover, inventory turnover which proxy for the quality of management 
increase their level of trade credit. 
 
                                               
18 We used only random effects for firms. With unbalanced panel data the estimation using firm and 
period random effects are not allowed in the econometric software Eviews version 6.0.  
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Detragiache et al. (2000), claim that asymmetric information presents small firms from 
renewing their loans. It is understandable to observe a more direct substitution between 
trade credit and short term loans. Following Berger and Udell (1995) we focus on model 
2 exclusively in short term debt (BC2). As we expected, for both of samples, the 
coefficient of bank credit2 (BC2) is negatively and statically significant at one percent 
level. The results are consistents with model (1) for remaining variables.  
 
These results are consistent with empirical evidence (Wilner 2000; Blasio, 2005; 
Petersen and Rajan 1997), indicating that trade credit is an expense substitute for bank 
debt, confirming that the small firms of this sample are credit rationed.  
 
Next, one could wonder why suppliers should extend, credit to companies that have 
been rationed by the banks. According to Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and 
Ellingsen (2004), the suppliers have a comparative advantage over traditional financial 
intermediaries in collecting information on other non-financial firm’s, in assessing their 
credit worthiness and finally in controlling their actions. 
 
Based on this informativeness advantage, we introduce in the model (3) for both 
samples, dummies variables for age.19 As pointed out by Berger and Udell (1995, 1998) 
age reflects public information, whereas the strength of the relationship, with banks 
and/or suppliers, reflects private information, available only to the lender and 
corresponds to the difference between information obtained as a result of reputation 
versus information obtained from monitoring.  
 
As we expected the variable age is positively and statistically significant at one percent 
level related with trade credit for young and small firms (infant and adolescent firms). 
For older firms we obtain an opposite coefficient, which reinforce the result that the 
small firms of this sample are credit rationed. 
 
The positive relationship between young firms and trade credit could be explained 
because trade credit helps to solve principal agent problems of managerial behaviour, 
more pronounced for small firms due to the lack of separation between ownership and 
                                               
19 We also include the square of the variable age to account for the possibility of non-linearity. The 
variable appears non significant and was eliminated from the models. 
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management, in line with the complementary hypothesis. In fact, suppliers have abilities 
to circumcise the traditional problems of informational asymmetry and moral hazard at 
least as well, if not better than banks: i) suppliers are supposed to possess a better 
knowledge of the technology and of the markets of its customers and hence can appraise 
their quality with a great precision than banks do; ii) suppliers may also threaten to stop 
future supplies and may be in a better position to repossess and resell goods in case of 
default than banks and iii) in lending goods, not cash as banks do, suppliers are less 
concerned with cash diversion by their customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997:689). 
 
If it is accepted that the cost of trade credit is higher than bank debt and small firm’s 
tend to experience a more rapid growth than old firms is quite understandable that a 
company will increase the former when bank debt is run out and it still has unsatisfied 
demand for funds.20 Furthermore, since the possibility of resorting to alternative 
financing sources apart from trade credit depends on the problems raised by adverse 
selection, the degree of substitution between trade credit and bank credit is expected to 
be higher for firms that are subject to a greater monopoly21.  
 
In order to distinguish the degree of substitution between trade credit and bank credit 
for firms that obtain funds from just one bank (DBank) and those doing so from several 
banks, we introduce in model (4) (for both samples) the variable DBank1*BC1. The 
substitution hypothesis has been confirmed; the coefficient of the variable DBank1*BC1 
is negative and statically significant when firms maintain a link with just one bank. 
Besides the fact that for Portuguese samples the variable Bank Credit1 reverts the signal 
when the variable DBank1*BC1 is introduced, the empirical evidence points to a relation 
of substitution between trade credit and bank credit, which may indicate the existence of 
rationing by financial institutions. Furthermore, a greater degree of substitution is 
obtained by firms working with one bank. This result seems to indicate that such firms 
                                               
20 Wilner (2000) argues that the higher trade credit interest rate is fair compensation for suppliers due to 
the large renegotiation concessions they grant to their customers, especially if financial distress occurs 
from their customers. 
21 It is well known that the establishment of a relationship between moneylender and borrower is a way of 
reducing the problems of asymmetric information (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984, 1991; Rajan, 
1992; Boot and Thakor, 2000). Nevertheless, maintaining a loan relationship with only one financial 
institution may also convey some disadvantages (Detragiache et al., 2000; Sharpe, 1990). In fact, 
companies that borrow from just one financial intermediary are “informationally captured”, as no one else 
knows the real risk of the firm. In these circumstances, the monopolistic relationship may be exploited in 
order to charge a greater interest rate on new loans or even to ration additional borrowing. 
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are subject to a greater monopoly by the financial institutions, which impedes their 
obtaining alternative financing apart from that of their trade credit suppliers22.  
 
4.2 The effect of the strength banking relationship on the availability of bank 
credit 
 
The results described in the previous section appear to indicate that those firms with a 
higher degree of substitution between bank credit and trade credit are ones that immerse 
in a more asymmetric environment. In fact, it could be argued that small firms basically 
have only two sources of external finance: trade credit and bank credit, because these 
firms do not have access to the capital markets.  
 
Indeed the situation is more complex. In recent years, the banking industry has 
experimented modifications and restructurings and also faced regulatory (the single 
market program in the European Union, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the U.S., the 
Basel II agreement) and technological changes that might affect the aggregate amount 
of credit supplied to the economy as well as the composition of banks credit portfolios 
(Degryse and Ongena, 2007; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Small business firms may be 
particularly affected by these changes because of their dependency of financial 
institutions for external finance (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al., 2001; Berger et 
al., 2001). Large banking institutions devote lesser proportions of their assets to SME, 
suggesting that consolidation in the financial system reduce the availability of credit to 
SME (Anand and Galetovic, 2006; Berger et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2007; Berger and 
Udell, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2007; Graig and Hardee, 2007). The financial 
distress in the banking industry may also impact lending to SME. In order to reduce 
their risk exposure, banks can ration SME credit and develop a politic of arm’s length 
debt (Berger and Udell, 2002; Boot and Thakor, 2000; Karceski, et al., 2005). 
 
It is well-known that banks elevate the interest rate as the borrower increases the 
demand for funds. High interest rates will encourage the debtor to choose projects with 
a greater risk because it now has to assume greater financial expenses (Myers, 1977; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
                                               
22 This monopolist effects is reinforced because when we substitute the variable Dbank1*BC1, by the 
variable Dbank2*BC1, the coefficient reserves the signal (positive) and is statistically significant. 
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In a context of asymmetric information, an increase in risk is too expensive, 
consequently some financial institutions may prefer to restrict the loans they give before 
they increase their interest rate. Therefore, the credit availability will increase with the 
interest rate until it reaches a maximum. Furthermore banks have incentive for 
establishing this maximum so that the market stays in a rationing situation. 
 
Because this credit rationing appears particularly harmful for SME, we intend now to 
analyse if information conveyed by trade credit could affect the level of the indebtnees 
of the small firms. In order to do so we examine the nexus between the level of bank 
debt and interest rate. The goal is tested if financial institutions price the debt they lend 
to the small firms, considering the strength of their relationship (see footnote 21). This 
point is important based on results obtained for model 4, table II: firms that indebt with 
fewer financial institutions are more likely to be subject to monopolist conditions. 
 
To contrast this point the two samples were divided into companies that obtain funds 
from just one bank than those that obtain funds from several banks. The samples were 
organized according to the number of banks the firms had worked with in 2006. In this 
way the Portuguese and Spanish samples were reduced to 110 and 2471 firms, 
respectively. 
 





jitit XInterestTC εληδββα ++++++ ∑
=1
210  (3) 
 
Where bank credit (BC) has been measured with the ratio of bank debt to total assets, 
trade credit (TC) is the ratio of the difference between debtors and creditors to total 
assets and interest is the ratio of financial expenses to total bank debt. Regarding control 
variables, it is reasonable to consider: i) size, ii) age; iii) profitability, iv) tangibility, v) 
coverage and vi) Altman Z-Score, variables which are taken into account by banks 
when they lend and pricing loans (see for example: Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger 
and Udell, 1995; Bonfim et al., 2008 and Canovas and Solano, 2006). In order to 
control for the possibility of non-linear relation as suggested by Stiglitz and Weiss 
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(1981), the variable interest is also included in quadratic form.23 The results are reported 
in Table III. 
 
Analysing the results presented in table III, we observe that the variable trade credit 
(TC) is negative and statically significant for Spanish firms, in all models, which 
confirms the substitution relation between bank credit and trade credit. Curiously, for 
Portuguese firms we obtain an opposite result. When we concentrate our analysis in 
variables Interest and Interest*Dbank1 (model 1) for both samples, it is not clear that the 
firms that borrow from just one bank are more financially restricted (the coefficient for 
both variables is negative). However, as it can be observed in model (1) the coefficient 
of the variable Interest2 is not statically significant, which indicates that the non-
linearity is not a problem. To control the existence of non-quadric performance and also 
to reduce potential problems of multicollinearity between the variable Interest and 
Interest2, a linear model was also set up in equation (2) of table III. A positive 
coefficient was obtained for the variable Interest*Dbank1 for Portuguese samples which 
indicate that these firms are more financially restricted and, therefore, obtain the same 
amount of bank fund but facing an increases interest rate. For Spanish firms the results 








                                               
23 It could be argued that bank credit and interest rate are also endogenous variables. Using GMM 
estimators and lagged variables in the estimation of the models help to control for this hypothetic 
problem. 
24 Lehmann and Newberger (2001) argue that if any inefficient allocation of resources reduces the 
benefits, the bank losses will be paid by the clients who maintain a relationship with a bank. 
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TABLE III 
The effect of the strength banking relationship on availability of bank credit 


























































































---------- ---------- ---------- 
0.058* 
(1.739) 
---------- ---------- ---------- 
Interest2 x Dbank2 ---------- ---------- 
-0.000*** 
(-4.222) 



























































































































Sargan Test  0,989 0.976 0.981 0.963 0.997 0.995 0.997 0.992 
Hausman Test (χ2) 187.419 115.885 123.277 115.885 37.842 12.572 45.512 12.435 
1- All regressions are estimated by using GMM, which are robust to the heterocedasticity. Sargan Test, tests of absence of over identification. T-Statistic are in parentheses. 
2- According to the Hausman Test, the bank credit models for the Spanish sample are estimated by fixed – effects; for Portuguese sample the estimation is based on random effects. 
3- Bank credit, which is proxied with the ratio of bank debt to total assets is the dependent variable. Dbank is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm works with just one bank (or two banks) in the 
regressions 1 and 2 (3 and 4) and zero otherwise. Interest is the ratio of financial expenses to total debt. For other variables, see definition in appendix I. 
***Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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According to Von Thadden (1994), borrowing from just two banks is sufficient to 
eliminate the negative aspect of aspects of a monopolistic relationship (e.g. the 
asymmetric evolution of the information between the bank and other lenders allow the 
bank to extract monopoly rents from the relationship), while it enables the company to 
enjoy the advantage of the relationship with each bank. In this way we introduce in 
model (3), table III the dummy variable Dbank2, which takes the value one if the firm 
maintains a relationship with two banks. As is shown in regression (3), for both of 
samples the concave relation (the coefficient of the variable Interest*Dbank2 is negative 
and statistically significant) holds for firms working with one or two banks. When the 
variables Interest2 and Interst2 * Dbank2 were removed from the model, the result 
reported by the variable Interest*Dbank2 seems to indicate that firms who work with 
two banks can obtain credit in more advantage conditions. These results are consistent 
with the ones in the previous section, indicating that the problem of adverse selection is 
much stronger for firms that work with less than three financial intermediaries. This is 
particularly relevant in our samples: more than fifty percent of small young firms 
maintain a relationship with just one bank (in our samples, the maximum number of 
banks that Spanish and Portuguese firms work with is 7 and 6 banks respectively). 
 
These results are in accordance with Degryse and Ongena (2007). These authors show 
that in several European countries, especially firms in countries characterized by 
European continental civil-low model, such as France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the 
cost of bank loans is either unaffected by 1 to 10 bases point per additional relationship, 
while in the U.S. the cost of bank loans typically increases with the number of bank 
relationships. These opposite results may be explained by the degree of 
disintermediation of the economies and therefore in companies` access to alternatives 
sources of financing. 
 
For the control variables, the results obtained for Spanish sample (models 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
confirm our expectations: large and older companies have a greater access to bank 
financing. Bank credit also increase for more profitable firms, firms with more capacity 
to pledge of collateral and less riskier firms [the mean of the variable Altman Z-Score is 
3,5 and 2,2 for Spanish and Portuguese SME respectively, values that could be 
considered in the range of uncertainty of default risk (Neves, 2006:215)]. Regarding the 
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Portuguese sample the results are quite different. Older and more profitable firms obtain 
higher levels of bank credit, whereas small firms are more credit constrained. 
 
Assuming that the size of the borrower is an inverse measure of its information 
opaqueness (the coefficient of the variable size is negative and statistically significant) 
and the age of the firms reflects the public reputation that is openly transmitted to the 
market (the coefficient of the variable age is positive and statically significant), it is 
reasonable to conclude that Portuguese banks avoid to support the fixed cost of 
screening and monitoring SME. In this context, and based on the result obtained for the 
variable trade credit (the coefficient is positive and statistically significant), we could 
argue that trade credit could act as a signal of firm’s quality and help young firms to 
build a “good reputation” in the borrower market at low cost (the results of the model 
(3) in table II, also confirms a positive relationship between more younger firms with 
trade credit). Trade credit could mitigate the information asymmetry; assuming that 
trade credit reveals the private information of the supplier to the bank, which, in turn, 
can update its beliefs about customer default risk (Biais and Gollier, 1997). The 
illiquidity of trade credit also prevents opportunistic borrowers to divert cash (Burkart 




Previous research implicitly assumes that the use of trade credit is at least partially the 
result of credit rationing, and is a very expensive source of funds when discounts for 
early payment are not taken (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
 
Using a panel data from a representative sample of Spanish and Portuguese SME 
operating in Manufacturing of Foods and Beverages (NACE codes 15 and 16), this 
study focuses on the question: Why is trade credit available when banking credit is 
rationed? With this aim we test: first if trade credit could be considered as a substitute 
and/or a complement to bank credit, in order to assess the existence of credit rationing, 
second if the availability of trade credit facilitates the access to bank credit, especially 
for young firms, by improving their reputation on borrower market. 
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Related to the first issue, our results indicate the existence of credit rationing among 
Spanish and Portuguese SME, since the substitution hypothesis between trade and bank 
credit is confirmed. Particularly, firms that maintain an exclusive relationship with one 
bank report a higher degree of substitution between both sources of financing, which 
indicate the greater severity of adverse selection problem in those companies. This 
monopolistic relationship puts the informed bank in a position to exert market power, 
which could impose hold-up costs for the firm, the soft-budge constrain problem is 
more likely to happen because the lender has the option to bail out the firm in case of 
distress. The establishment of relationships with more than one bank, as suggested by 
Von Thadden (1994) and Degryse and Ongena (2007), could reduce such exploitation, 
as confirmed by our result.  
 
Nevertheless the fact that the substitution hypothesis is confirmed, our empirical results 
seem to indicate that the substitution and complementary hypothesis are not mutually 
exclusives, if we take into account a specific class of firms the younger and smaller 
firms. In fact, small and young firms have not yet been able to establish a reputation, so 
banks do not have any information about the competence and honesty of managers, nor 
about the type of projects that may arise. These elevate the cost of production of 
information and the fixed costs of screening and monitoring such firms. 
 
Notwithstanding, suppliers have a monitoring advantage over banks. Suppliers obtain 
information about the borrower routinely and at low cost, from their transaction with the 
firm. The most valuable aspect of this information may be how current it is. By 
monitoring repayment and using discounts as trip wire, suppliers get easy information 
on firm´s financial and economic health. This informative advantage allows suppliers to 
provide financial support better than banks do, when firms are small, young and opaque 
(Wilner, 2000). Our empirical evidence for the variable age, and agree with Berger and 
Udell (1995, 1998), confirms that the variable age is positively related with trade credit 
for infant and adolescent firms. This positive relationship, and in line with the theories  
which emphasize the informational role of trade credit (Biais and Gollier, 1997), could 
be explained because trace credit helps to solve principal agent problems of managerial 
behaviour, due to the lack of separation between ownership and management in more 
younger and smaller firms. The illiquidity of trade credit also facilitates borrowing by 
limiting the borrower’s discretion (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). In that way trade 
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credit stimulates small firms to improve their reputation, as it acts as a signal about 
firm´s quality, than facilitates access to bank debt. 
 
This study focuses on the signalling role of trade credit, a topic that is still not yet very 
explored in the literature, however more attention should be given to the price 
discrimination aspect of trade credit and the influence of trade discount policy. Finally, 
further research should investigate how the interaction between information motivated 
bank credit rationing and trade credit varies with the business cycle; how this affects the 
conduct of monetary policy and how trade credit, by generating a chain of bankruptcies 





APPENDIX  I 
 







































































Altman  Z–Score = 1.2 [working capital / Total Assets] + 1.4 [retained earnings / Total Assets] + 3.3 






DBank1 = Dummy that takes value 1 if the company works with just one bank and 0  in the opposite case. 
 










































































































































Mean 0.207 0.294 0.231 0.005 5.862 931.079 11.484 0.409 5.552 2.892 20.340 37.462 54.900 7.486 0.740 0.406 0.037 10.616 3.549 
Median 0.155 0.237 0.154 0.000 5.849 346.908 11.000 0.385 2.838 0.663 4.604 9.855 10.426 0.025 0.072 0.394 0.021 1.139 2.470 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 16.594 0.895 11.034 61949.86 25.000 1.000 11997.40 5420.667 9717.320 9831.599 154964.1 287953.0 7243.000 1.000 172.667 3041.033 4881.597 
Minimum -1.849 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.298 0.000 1.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -6230.856 -5614.930 0.000 -1.000 -2.699 0.000 -0.807 -1141.831 -3508.034 
Std. Dev 0.193 0.274 0.291 0.045 1.402 2005.516 6.032 0.250 78.697 56.142 158.142 187.935 914.255 1392.981 43.092 0.251 0.898 59.818 39.277 
Skewness 1.145 0..665 12.657 9.828 -0.046 7.670 0.281 0.341 111.906 63.791 15.065 13.787 133.647 206.651 153.915 0.187 177.200 19.798 44.723 
Kurtosis 4.939 2.383 575.402 109.735 3.341 104.906 2.243 2.172 14717.02 4715.598 911.603 576.361 21452.26 42717.54 25448.81 2.052 33306.05 755.601 7751.267 











































































































































Mean 0.268 0.401 0.093 0.114 5.618 1767.319 8.000 0.395 3.990 1.501 18.349 44.327 63.095 2.059 0.367 0.467 0.028 13.591 2.209 
Median 0.137 0.267 0.000 0.000 4.960 142.417 6.000 0.362 2.884 0.603 2.416 2.838 13.912 0.059 0.063 0.460 0.019 0.271 1.984 
Maximum 9.901 24.565 2.190 0.996 10.517 36925.27 25.000 5.668 137.127 705.033 2273.518 2240.456 4448.667 275.924 52.067 3.275 0.845 697.507 295.276 
Minimum -23.279 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.590 0.000 1.000 0.000 -29.713 -1.403 -2883.343 -1866.582 0.006 -0.974 0.000 0.000 0.000 -197.219 -50.104 
Std. Dev 0.794 1.018 0.181 0.200 2.028 3841.455 5.901 0.280 5.696 18.542 210.5540 235.814 241.954 16.741 2.617 0.260 0.051 48.944 8.217 
Skewness -15.753 20.480 3.422 1.955 0.369 4.310 1.301 4.774 10.953 37.416 -0.006 2.518 10.867 12.314 13.868 0.851 7.893 6.427 30.674 
Kurtosis 544.960 483.417 22.757 6.016 2.226 28.325 3.618 86.733 225.399 1419.584 63.983 30.997 154.435 172.398 225.107 11.220 91.386 59.635 1103.888 

















































































































































































































































































































































































1For definition of the variables see appendix I. All variables are measured in thousand of Euros, except ratios. 





Matrix of correlations – Portugal1 
 
1For definition of the variables see appendix I. All variables are measured in thousand of Euros, except ratios. 
































































































































































































1.000        









































































































































































ANAND, B. N. and GALETOVIC, A. (2006): “Relationships, competition and the structure of 
investment banking markets”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 54 (2): 151-199. 
 
ARELLANO, M. (2003): “Panel data Econometric”, Oxford University Press. 
 
ARELLANO, M. and BOND, S. (1991): “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo. 
Evidence and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies, 58:277-
197. 
 
BECK, T.; DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A. and MAKSIMOVIC, V. (2003) “Financial and Legal Institutions 
and Firm Size”, Working Paper, World Bank. 
 
BERGER, A. N. and FRAME, S. (2006): “Small Business Credit Scoring and Credit Availability”, 
Journal of Small Business Management, 45 (1): 5-22. 
 
BERGER, A. N.; GOLDBERG, L.G. and WHITE, L. J. (2001): “The Effects of Dynamic Changes in 
Bank Competition on the Supply of Small Business Credit”, European Finance Review 5: 
115-139. 
 
BERGER, A. N.; KLAPPER L. F. and UDELL G. F. (2001): “The ability of banks to lend to 
informationally opaque small businesses”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 25: 2127-2167.  
 
BERGER, A. N.; MILLER, N. H.; PETERSEN, M. A.; RAJAN, R. G. and STEIN, J. C. (2005): 
“Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and 
small banks”, The Journal of Finance Economics, 76: 237-269. 
 
BERGER, A. N.; ROSEN R. J. and UDELL G. F. (2007): “Does market size structure affect 
competition? The case of small business lending”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 31: 11-33. 
 
BERGER, A. N. and UDELL, G. F. (1995): “Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm 
finance”, Journal of Business, 68 (3): 351-381. 
 
BERGER, A. N. and UDELL, G. F. (2002): “ Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship 
Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure”, The Economics Journal, 112: 
32–53. 
 
BERGER, A. N. and UDELL, G. F. (1998): “The economics of small business finance: The roles of 
private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle”, Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 22 (8): 613-673. 
 
BERLIN, M. (2003): “Trade Credit: Why do Production Firms Act as Financial Intermediaries?”, 
Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Q3: 21-28. 
 
BERNANKE, B. S. and BLINDER, A. (1988): “Credit, Money and Aggregate Demand”, American 
Economic Review, 78 (2): 435-439. 
 
BIAIS, B. and GOLLIER, C. (1997): “Trade Credit and Credit Rationing”, The Review of Financial 
Studies, 10 (4): 903-937. 
 
BIAIS. B.; HILLION, P. and MALÉCOT, J. F. (1995): “La Structure Financière des Entreprises: Une 
Investigation Empirique sur Données Française”, Economie et prevision, 120: 15-28. 
 
BLASIO, G. (2005): “Does Trade Credit Substitute Bank Credit? Evidence from Firm–level Data”, 
Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siene SpA, 34 (1): 85-112. 
 
 32 
BOND, P. (2005): “Bank and Nonbank Financial Intermediation”, Journal of Finance, 59 (6): 2489-
2529. 
 
BONFIM, D.; DAI, Q. and FRANCO, F. (2008): “The number of bank relationships and the cost of 
borrowing. An empirical study” paper presented at European Financial Management 
Association, 25 – 28 , June, Greece. 
 
BOOT, A. W. A. and THAKOR, A. V. (2000): “Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?”, 
The Journal of Finance, 55 (2): 679-713. 
 
BREIG, (1994): “Bank Lending and Corporate Financing in Major Industrial Countries: Are France 
and Germany Really Similar?, Working Paper, Albert Ludwing Universitat, Breisgau. 
 
BRENNAN, M. J., MAKSIMOVIC, V. and ZECHNER, J. (1988): “Vendor Financing”, Journal of 
Finance, 43 (5): 1127-1141. 
 
BRICK, I. E. and FUNG, W. K. H. (1984): “Taxes and the Theory of Trade Debt”, Journal of 
Finance, 39 (4): 1169-1176. 
 
BURKART, M. and ELLINGSEN, T. (2004): “In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit”, The 
American Economic Review, 94 (3): 569-590. 
 
BURKART, M.; GIANNETTI, M. and ELLINGSEN, T. (2004): “What You Sell is What You Lend? 
Explaining Trade Credit Contracts”, CEPR Working Paper N.º 4823 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=702928).   
 
CAMERON, R. (1967):”Banking in the early stages of industrialization”, New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
CANOVAS, G. H. and SOLANO, M. P. (2006): “Banking Relationships: Effects on Debt Terms for 
Small Spanish Firms”, Journal of Small Business Management, 44 (3): 315-333. 
 
COOK, L. D. (1997): “Trade Credit and Bank Finance: Financing Small Firms in Russia”, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 14: 493-518. 
 
DEGRYSE, H. and ONGENA, S. (2007): “Competition and regulation in the banking sector: A review 
of empirical evidence on the sources of bank rents”, in Thakor, A. and Boot, Handbook of 
Financial Intermediation and Banking (Elsevier) forthcoming. 
 
DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A. and MAKSIMOVIC, V. (2001): “Firms as Financial Intermediaries: 
Evidence from Trade Credit Data”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper nº 2696 
(http://ssr.com/abstract=632764) 
 
DETRAGIACHE, E.; GARELLA, P. and GUISO, L. (2000): “Multiple versus Single Banking 
Relationships: Theory and Evidence”, The Journal of Finance, 55 (3): 1133-1161. 
 
DIAMOND, D. (1984) “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 51: 393-414. 
 
DIAMOND, D. (1991) “Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly 
Placed Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, 99: 689-721. 
 
EMERY, G. (1987): “An Optimal Financial Response to Variable Demand”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 22 (2): 209-225. 
 
FERRIS, J. S. (1981): “A Transactions Theory of Trade Credit Use”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
94 (2): 243-270.  
 
 33 
FISHMAN, R. and LOVE, I. (2003) “Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development and Industry 
Growth”, Journal of Finance, 58 (1):353-374. 
 
FRANK, M. and MAKSIMOVIC, V. (2005): “Trade Credit, Collateral, and Adverse Selection”, 
Working Paper, University of Maryland (http://ssrn.com/abstract=87868). 
 
FREIXAS, X. (1993): “Short-Term Credit versus Accounts Receivable Financing”, Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra Economics, Working Paper, 27: 1993. 
 
GIANNETTI, M. (2003): “Do Better Institutions Mitigate Agency Problems? Evidence from 
Corporate Finance Choices” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (1): 185-212. 
 
GRAIG, S. G. and HARDEE, P. (2007): “The impact of bank consolidation on small business credit 
availability”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 31: 1237-1263. 
 
GUEDES, J.C. and MATEUS, C. (2008): Trade Credit Linkages along a supply chain: Evidence for 
the Italian Textile sector”, paper presented at 5th Portuguese Finance Network (PFN), 10-12 
July, Coimbra. 
 
HAUSMAN, J. (1978): “Specification Tests in Econometrics”, Econometrica 46: 1251-1272. 
 
IAPMEI – Instituto de Apoio às Pequenas e Médias Empresas e ao Investimento (2007): “PME em 
números”, http://www.iapmei.pt. 
 
JAIN, N. (2001) “Monitoring Costs and Trade Credit”, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 
41 (1): 89-110. 
 
KARCESKI, J.; ONGENA, S. and SMITH, D. C. (2005): “The Impact of Bank Consolidation on 
Commercial Borrower Welfare”, The Journal of Finance, 60 (4): 2043-2082. 
 
LEE, Y. W. and STOWE, J. D. (1993): “Product Risk, Asymmetric Information and Trade Credit”, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28 (2): 285-300. 
 
LELAND, H. and PYLE, D. (1977): “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation”, Journal of Finance, 32: 371-387. 
 
LEHMANN, E. and NEWBERGER, D. (2001): “Do lending Relationships Matter? Evidence from 
Bank Survey Data in Germany”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45:339-
359.   
 
LONG, M. S.; MALITZ, I. B. and RAVID, S. A. (1993): “Trade Credit, Quality Guarantees and 
Product Marketability”, Financial Management, 22 (4): 117-127. 
 
MATEUT, S. and MIZEN, P. (2002): “Trade Credit and Bank Lending: An investigation into the 
determinants of UK Manufacturing Firms”, Access to trade credit, Working Paper. 
 
MELTZER, A.H. (1960) “Mercantile Credit, Monetary Policy, and Size of Firms”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 42 (4): 429-443. 
 
MYERS, S. (1977): “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”, Journal of Financial Economics, 5 
(2):147-175.  
 
MYERS, S. and MAJLUF, N. S. (1984): “Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not have”, Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 187-221. 
 
MYERS, S. and RAJAN R. G. (1998): “The Paradox of liquidity”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
113 (3): 733-771. 
 
 34 
NADIRI, M. I. (1969): “The Determinants of Trade Credit in the U.S. Total Manufacturing Sector”, 
Econometrica, 37 (3): 408-423. 
 
NEVES, J. C. (2006): “Análise Financeira”, Texto Editores, 17a Edição. 
 
NG, C.K.; SMITH, J.K. and SMITH, R.L. (1999) “Evidence on Determinants of Credit Terms Used in 
Interfirm Trade”, Journal of Finance, 54 (3): 1109-1129. 
 
NILSEN, J. H. (2002) “Trade Credit and Bank Lending Channel”, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 34 (1): 226-253 
 
PETERSEN, M. A. and RAJAN, R. G.  (1994): “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence 
from Small Business Data”, The Journal of Finance, 49 (1): 3-37. 
 
PETERSEN, M. and RAJAN, R. (1995) “The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending 
Relationships”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (2):407-443. 
 
PETERSEN, M. A. and RAJAN, R. G.  (1997): “Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence”, The Review of 
Financial Studies, 10 (3): 661-691.  
 
RAJAN, R. (1992): “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arm´s –Length 
Debt”, Journal of Finance, 47 (4):1367-1400. 
 
RAMEY, V. (1992) “The Source of Fluctuations in Money: Evidence from Trade Credit”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 30:171-193. 
 
SCHWARTZ, R.A. (1974) “An Economic Model of Trade Credit”, Journal of Financial Quantitative 
Analysis, 9: 643-657.   
 
SCHWARTZ, R. A. and WHITCOMB, D. (1978): “Implicity Transfers in the Extension of Trade 
Credit”, in Kenneth E. Boulding and Thomas F. Wilson, eds. The channels of redistribution 
through the financial system. New York, Praeger: 191-208. 
 
SCHWARTZ, R. A. and WHITCOMB, D. (1979) “The Trade Credit Decision” In James L. Bicksler, 
ed. Handbook of Financial Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland: 257-2773. 
 
SHARPE, S. (1990): “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A stylized 
Model of Customer Relationships”, Journal of Finance, 45 (4): 1069-1087. 
 
SMITH, J. K. (1987): Trade Credit and Informational Asymmetry”, Journal of Finance, 42, (4): 863-
869. 
 
STIGLITZ, J. and WEISS, A. (1981): “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, 
American Economic Review, 71: 393-410. 
 
VON THADDEN, 1994: “The Commitment of Finance, Duplicated Monitoring and the Investment 
Horizon”, Working Paper. 
 
WILNER, B. S. (2000): “The Exploitation of Relationships in Financial Distress: The Case of Trade 





Nome Teixeira, Andreia Manuela Martins 
Morada Monte – Refontoura 
4610-696 Felgueiras  
Telemóvel 962323920 
Correio electrónico teixeira.adr@gmail.com 
Nacionalidade Portuguesa 





- Frequência no “Mestrado em Economia Financeira” na Universidade da Beira Interior, desde Setembro 
de 2007: 
i) 1.º Semestre: parte lectiva; 
ii) 2.º Semestre: realização da dissertação de mestrado intitulada: “Does trade credit facilitate access to 
bank finance? An empirical evidence from Portuguese and Spanish small medium size enterprises”. 
 
- Licenciatura de Economia pela Universidade da Beira Interior, com média de 13 valores 
(Setembro/2002 a Junho/2006). 
 
- Frequência do 1º semestre do 4º ano da Licenciatura em Economia, na Universidad de Valladolid, 
España, ao abrigo do programa Erasmus, (Outubro de 2005 até Fevereiro de 2006). 
 
- Frequência e aprovação de curso de Inglês, em Harrow House International College, Londres, 
Inglaterra, desde 16 Agosto de 2005 até 31 de Agosto de 2005. 
 
- Curso Livre de Inglês, com duração de 45 horas, na Universidade da Beira Interior, desde Março de 
2005 até Junho de 2005. 
 
ACTIVIDADE PROFISSIONAL 
- Gestora comercial na Caixa Geral de Depósitos, desde 4 de Junho de 2007; 
- Formação bancária, por técnicos da Caixa Geral de Depósitos, desde 4 de Junho de 2007 até 19 de 




Paper “Does trade credit facilitate access to bank finance? An empirical evidence from Portuguese and 
Spanish small medium size enterprises”aceite na “31st Institute for Small Business & Entrepreneurship 
Conference”, Belsfat – N. Irlanda, 5-7 Novembro 2008. 
 
APTIDÕES E COMPETÊNCIAS SOCIAIS 
 
- Responsável pedagógica do Núcleo de Economia, da Universidade da Beira Interior no biénio 
2002/2003 e 2003/2004. 
- Delegada de turma em vários anos lectivos. 
- Realização do conservatório de música. 
 
APTIDÕES E COMPETÊNCIAS DE ORGANIZAÇÃO 
 
- Organização de três semanas de Economia, na Universidade da Beira Interior, em 2002/2003 e 
2003/2004. 






FORMAÇÃO ACADÉMICA E PROFISSIONAL 
